The Probert Encyclopaedia of Warfare

BATTLE OF CHARLEROI

The Battle of Charleroi was fought during the Great War between French and German forces on the 21st to the 24th of August 1914 as the French attempted to make an orderly retreat from Belgium under intense German pressure. The operation probably saved the French 5th Army and slowed the German advance into northern France considerably.

Charleroi was the most important battle of the Great War up to the first Battle of the Marne, and was remarkable for the escape of a French army from an envelopment such as the Germans carried out in 1870 at Sedan. The German staff expected to reap the fruit of the treacherous advance through Belgium at this point, but its plans were thwarted by the quick manoeuvring of the two generals concerned - Lanrezac on the French side, and Sir John French on the British.

Owing to changes in its organization made by Joffre at the last minute, the 5th French army (commanded by Lanrezac) had not completed its concentration before it was attacked. It was composed of the 1st, 10th, 3rd, and 18th corps, in order from right to left, though the last was not ordered from Alsace before August the 16th, and did not arrive until August the 21st. It was stationed on the eve of the battle from Givet on the Meuse to the line of the Sambre, near Namur - which fortress was to protect its centre - and Charleroi, with its extreme left north of the Sambre near Anderlues. It included five independent divisions, badly equipped, and may have totalled some 250,000 men.

At Namur were 25,000 Belgian troops, somewhat shaken in moral, under General Michel, and at Maubeuge a mass of 30,000 reservists and territorials, badly equipped owing to the shortage of boots, and without transport. They could not be regarded as available for field warfare. The mission of the 5th army, in conjunction with the British Expeditionary Force, then arriving at Maubeuge and moving towards Mons, was to protect the French left flank and to strike the German right, which was supposed by the French high command not to extend far west of the Ardennes.

The position of the 5th army was one of great peril. Three German armies were closing upon it - namely, the 1st (Kluck), passing across its front to execute a vast enveloping movement - and if the British should be encountered to deal with them; the 2nd (Bulow), moving directly upon its front on the Sambre; and the 3rd (Hausen), the existence of which does not appear to have been known to the French supreme command, moving against its right flank and rear. Thus the 5th army and the British were threatened with the double envelopment which marked Cannae and Sedan, two of the most famous battles in history before the Great War.

The total German force is placed by Baumgarten-Crusius at 30 infantry and 5 cavalry divisions (each German cavalry division included rifle battalions, machine-gun companies and cyclists, besides cavalry and horse artillery, and thus was far more formidable than a British or French cavalry division), against 16 British and French infantry divisions and 4 cavalry divisions, In fighting force on the spot the Germans were about two to one (600,000 to about 320,000 men).

Lanrezac with good reason was anxious as to his position. He had warned Joffre in vain of the risk of such a great German turning movement as was now being carried out. On August the 20th he was ordered to take the offensive in combination with the 4th army (Langle de Gary) on his right, which was separated from him by a wide gap, and with the 3rd army (Ruffey). He was unable to do so because all his troops had not arrived, and the British were not yet in position. On the 21st he pointed this out to the French headquarters, and was told that he could wait until the 24th before attacking. It was fortunate that he did not advance on the 20th; had he done so he would have walked with his whole army into the trap which the Germans were trying to set for him.

On August the 21st the Germans took the initiative. Troops under Gallwitz began the bombardment of Namur with heavy German and Austrian artillery, and two German corps appeared on the Sambre, and with detachments forced the passage of that river at Tamines and Jemeppe, driving back detachments of the French 10th and 3rd corps. French documents were captured afterwards which showed that Lanrezac's intention was to allow portions of the German army to cross the Sambre, and then fall on them in full strength, a judicious plan which his corps commanders disregarded by making a series of ill-concerted attacks. On the French left, Sordet's cavalry was pushed back, opening a serious gap between the 5th French army and the British.

That same evening Hausen's 3rd army at three points near Dinant attempted to force the passage of the Meuse, gravely threatening the communications of Lanrezac and engaging the attention of the French 1st corps - which nevertheless was able to protect the river line. That night Bulow announced that he would fight the great battle on the 23rd. Perfect cooperation between Bulow and Hausen was necessary to bring off the stroke. Fortunately for the Allies, Bulow developed a violent attack with four corps on the Sambre on the 22nd before Hausen was ready. After severe fighting the Germans pushed across the Sambre and penetrated into Charleroi, where they burnt many of the houses and killed many inhabitants. Heavy loss was inflicted on the Guard by a counter-attack of the 38th Algerian division south of Chatelet, but French authorities stated that their own casualties were 'terrible'. By nightfall the French had been driven back to a line which ran from near Thuin to Mettet, and the Germans were clear of the difficult industrial district. This retirement exposed the flank of the British at Mons, and was one of the reasons why Sir John French had to retreat.

On the evening of August the 22nd Lanrezac issued orders for an attack on Bulow's army; but during that same night Hausen placed 340 guns in position on the east bank of the Meuse, from Yvoir to Blamont, to cover a crossing and take Lanrezac in flank and rear. To meet this attack, on August the 23rd the 1st French corps had to be withdrawn from the front northwards, where it was on the point of administering the coup de grace to the Guards; but it succeeded in stopping the 3rd German army. In the morning German airmen reported that the roads behind Lanrezac's front were crowded with disorderly columns retiring south-west and west. About the same time German troops penetrated into Namur, moving between the forts, and the Belgian field troops and three French battalions there were forced to decamp with all speed, losing heavily in their retreat.

But at the critical moment the French on the Meuse, notwithstanding the enormous artillery ascendancy of Hausen's army, inflicted such heavy loss that by nightfall no strong German force had crossed the river. At 4.30p.rn. German airmen reported the general retreat of the French, though, according to French authorities, Lanrezac did not order this until 9 pm. It was the news of this retreat which led Sir John French to break off the Battle of Mons. By the morning of the 24th the 5th army held a front from Beaumont to Rosee, and the danger of envelopment from Hausen's army had practically vanished. It fell back, despite heavy loss, in fairly good order to another line between Avesnes and Regniowez.

The losses on both the German and French sides were considerable. Bulow claimed that he only lost 11,000 men, and that the French losses were at least double; he said that he took 4,000 prisoners and 36 guns, but he gave no figures for Hausen's loss, which is known to have been considerable. Lanrezac's management of the battle was severely criticised in France, and he was superseded soon after it by Franchet d'Esperey. But he had to contend with superior numbers and a deplorably bad strategic position, due to the German movement through Belgium and the sudden apparition of Hausen's army. If the line of the Sambre had been defended with more energy, Lanrezac could not have escaped, and could not, by saving the 5th army, have saved France.

The Germans regard the battle as a tactical success for themselves but a strategic failure, and such it was. Many of the advantages gained by the faithless advance through Belgium were lost when Lanrezac and French escaped the toils. Hausen was removed, ostensibly on the ground of ill-health, after the Marne, but really it would seem because the German Staff blamed him for failing to cut off the French. As Crusius points out, the real fault rested with the German high command, which failed to profit by an extraordinarily favourable situation.

In his book The March on Paris, General von Kluck states that the Germans only learnt on August the 22nd of the presence of British troops in front of the second army (Bulow), The more important was, it observes Kluck, that his own army, the first, should keep well to the westward, and so outflank the British, but an army order directed Kluck's army to wheel to the left in support of Bulow, and this order was upheld in spite of Kluck's appeal to the supreme command. He says that had he been free he could have outflanked the British army from the west, forced it back on the French fifth army (Lanrezao), and taken both in the rear.
Research Battle of Charleroi