Douglas Haig (first earl Haig) was a British field marshal. He was born in 1861 and died in 1928. After seeing action in the Sudan in 1898 and during the South African War, he was given command of the 1st Army Corps in France in 1914 and in 1915 commanded the British Expeditionary Force in France during the Great War. Under pressure from the French commander, Joseph Joffre, he undertook the Battle of the Somme in 1916, which resulted in very heavy casualties and little territorial gain. Under the supreme command of Foch, Haig directed the final victoriousassault on the Hindenburg line. Research Douglas Haig
Sir John Denton Pinkstone French was a British soldier and the 1st earl of Ypres. He was born in 1852 at Ripple, Kent and died in 1925. After joining the navy in 1866 he transferred to the army in 1874 and served with the 19th Hussars in the Sudan from 1884 until 1885. During the Boer War he was cavalry commander, and from 1911 until 1914 was Chief of the Imperial General Staff. In 1913 he was made a field marshall and took command of the British Expeditionary Force in France in 1914. Replaced by Haig, he became Commander-in-Chief of the home forces in 1915. Research John French
There were two Battles of Cambrai during the Great War. The first was a British victory in November 1917, the second Battle of Cambrai was part of the great Allied attack of September and October 1918.
During the retreat of the British and French armies from Belgium after the battles of Mons and Charleroi (August 23rd-24th, 1914), efforts were made by the French forces in Flanders to strike the flank of the advancing German army and facilitate the retirement of the British. The 61st and 62nd French reserve divisions and 84th Territorial division under General d'Amade, with General Sordet's cavalry corps, took part in these operations.
On August the 26th 1914, they were heavily engaged near Cambrai with the 2nd German Infantry Corps (forming part of Kluck's 1st Army), while the British were fighting at Le Cateau. The French divisions were newly mobilised, wanting in coherence, and were exposed to the attack of some of the best troops in the German army. Inferior in numbers, and greatly inferior in artillery and equipment, they were rapidly driven back; Cambrai was seized by the Germans on August the 26th, and d'Amade's infantry were so greatly shaken that Joffre in a message of September the 3rd expressed the hope that they might be 'able to recover some steadiness'. But by their sacrifice they covered the withdrawal of the British from Le Cateau, and thus actually rendered important services.
From this time until the end of 1917 there was no fighting around Cambrai, as, the Germans' line being well to the west of it, the city was outside the actual battle zone. The battle of the Somme, in the autumn of 1916, had Bapaume and Peronne as its immediate objectives, and Cambrai and St Quentin as the ultimate goal.
The first battle of Cambrai began on November the 20th, 1917, when Sir Douglas Haig, as the best means of assisting the Italians, who were then being heavily attacked, determined to deliver a sudden blow on the British front. The intended battle was of a revolutionary type, the first of a new order in war; it was to be marked by two new features, both of which had been planned by the staff of the Tank Corps in the summer of 1917. They were the employment of tanks in masses to break through the German line where it was strongest, and the abandonment of the long, preliminary artillerybombardment which up to that date had been usual before a battle, to cut the wire, shake the opposing infantry, and prepare the way for the final assault.
The point selected was on the front of the 3rd army (Byng), west of Cambrai, where the ground was suitable for tank movements. It had the defect, which was pointed out by the Tank Staff that a break-through there, if successful, would bring the British up against the German system of water and canal defence, from near Cantaing to Marcoing, Masnieres, Crevecoeur, and Banteux. The scheme of operations provided for the employment of 350 tanks and 2 corps of infantry;
these were to be thrown suddenly upon the Germans, who formed part of Marwitz's 2nd army. All the tanks were to be put in at the outset; there was to be no reserve to exploit any victory, and this decision was taken against the advice of the tank leaders. The Hindenburg line would have to be crossed; it consisted of three lines of trenches, each 12 feet (3.6 meters) or more wide, with wide belts of strong wire in front. Provision was made for bridging the trenches with special fascines carried by the tanks.
The attack opened at 6.20a.m. on the 20th of November 1917, in mist, when the whole line of tanks swept forward, led in the centre by Major-General H. Elles, commander of the Tank Corps, and followed by the infantry, who had not had previous experience of working with tanks. The front of attack was 6 miles from Havrincourt to La Vacquerie. As the tanks advanced, 1,000 British guns suddenly opened and maintained a creeping barrage. When the Germans saw that the tanks were able to cross the Hindenburg trenches, many of them fled in panic, but at the villages there was severe fighting, due in some cases to the fact that the infantry had not been able to keep pace with the tanks. Havrincourt and Ribecourt were carried, but at Flesquieres many tanks were put out of action by field guns, and the German resistance was stubborn.
At Marcoing an important bridge was captured by a tank before the Germans could destroy it; but at Masnieres, the bridge, vital for an enveloping advance against Cambrai, was so damaged that when a tank officer gallantly tried to cross it, it gave way slowly under him and finally collapsed; and other tanks which arrived could not cross the Schelde Canal. None the less, they enabled the infantry to force a passage, covering them with their fire. At nightfall the British had penetrated at points 10,000 yards, taking all three trenches of the Hindenburg line, and captured Graincourt, Marcoing, and Masnieres; they had isolated Flesquieres; tanks had also pushed into Bourlon Wood, but the infantry, from exhaustion, were unable to follow and support them.
On November the 21st the battle was resumed by Sir J. Byng with tired infantry, and tanks which had been through one great engagement already. Cantaing was taken, as also Fontaine-Notre-Dame, bringing the British close up to Cambrai on the west, but Fontaine-Notre-Dame was lost the next day to a furious German counter-attack.
Nearly all Bourlon Wood was secured on November the 23rd. German reserves were now arriving and efforts to storm Bourlon village and to recover Fontaine-Notre-Dame failed, though they were renewed on November the 25th, 26th, and 27th. The tank crews had been fought to a standstill, and the infantry were worn out. The position of Cambrai as a great railway junction enabled the Germans to bring up fresh troops from every direction.
On November the 27th the battle was broken off. The British had taken 10,500 prisoners and 142 guns; the German losses in prisoners were double the British casualties in the first two days of the battle. The effect on the German army was serious, and was intensified by the German reports, which frightened their men by stating that the victory had been snatched by the British use of tanks in masses. Most important was the influence on the French command, which had hitherto been doubtful of the value of tanks, but from the date of the battle entertained no more doubts. General Franchet d'Esperey's comment on it, that it was a great victory, was fully justified in the light of subsequent events. The tactics first tested at Cambrai were those which led to the far-reaching successes gained by Foch on July the 18th, 1918, and by the British in the battle of Amiens on August the 8th 1918. This battle marks a turning point in military history - the vindication of mechanical war.
It was unfortunate for the British army that the great success won in the first part of this battle was followed by a counter-stroke in which much of the fruit of the earlier victory was lost, because this led in that army to a belief that tanks were, after all, a doubtful weapon. It undoubtedly delayed their rapid construction on the largest possible scale. Immediately after their reverse, the Germans decided at all cost to attack, in order to clear Cambrai, a point of extreme importance to them because of its railway facilities.
The plan worked out by the Germans provided for a surprise assault at two points, on each side of the salient in which lay Bourlon Wood, from the south-east by a group of 12 divisions advancing between Cantaing and Vendhuile, and from the north-west by a group of five divisions, advancing three hours after the first attack had begun, between Moeuvres and Bourlon. Yet another division was to attack Bourlon Wood frontally, while the salient was being pinched out. The British force holding the front was only six divisions strong, so that the Germans had a strength of three to one, 18 divisions to 6.
The German tactics were skilful. The bombardment which preceded the first attack was sufficiently strong to keep the British troops under cover without at first seriously alarming them ; it was followed by a series of aeroplane attacks, the machines flying low in squadrons, and machine-gunning and bombing the British trenches, after which the German trench mortars opened, and the German infantry, about 8 a.m. on November the 30th, swept into the British position on the south-eastern section of attack. They advanced rapidly with great bravery and penetrated deep, taking Villers-Guislain, Gonnelieu, and Gouzeaucourt, but not without fierce fighting. At noon the Guards came into action and recaptured Gouzeaucourt, attacking with the greatest gallantry and promptitude. Tanks of three battalions, which had been opened up for overhaul and repair, were able to assist the infantry in the afternoon. The recovery of much of the lost ground was assisted by the determination with which detachments of British troops had held their positions even when outflanked and surrounded ; the 29th division specially distinguished itself in this way.
The north-western German attack followed, as had been arranged, after the south-eastern attack had already made great progress. The German infantry advanced in dense waves against the 47th, 2nd, and 56th British divisions, which offered a most stubborn and determined resistance and inflicted on the Germans very heavy losses, enfilading their advancing waves of infantry with machine-gun fire and mowing them down. The German accounts speak of their 'desperate and most strenuous defence'. Some ground was gained by the Germans but at a bitter price. A company of the 13th Essex here fought to the very last, -deciding after a council of war to have no surrender, and its heroism was not in vain. In Bourlon Wood the Germans, made a little progress despite an equally gallant resistance offered by the 1st Berkshire.
British reserves were brought up and a force of French artillery came into action during the afternoon of November the 30th. On December the 1st the battle was renewed, the Germans attempting on the north to hold the British at Bourlon Wood, while their southern attack penetrated deep and cut them. off. The Guards fought their way into Gonnelieu on the southern front with the aid of tanks; GaucheWood was recovered with the cooperation of tanks; and a great effort was made to recapture Villers-Guislain, but it failed owing to the violence of the German machine-gun fire and the small number of tanks available. Masnieres had to be abandoned owing to the loss of commanding ground south of it; and the troops were successfully withdrawn during the night of December 1st to 2nd.
On December the 2nd and 3rd there was heavy fighting between Gonnelieu and Bourlon, and the Germans captured La Vacquerie and forced the evacuation of the ground held beyond the Schelde Canal near Marcoing. December the 4th passed quietly with nothing but local fighting, but on the 5th and 6th fresh efforts were made by the Germans to capture Welsh Ridge, north of Gonnelieu; and though these were repulsed, the British command decided to abandon Bourlon Wood and the ground north of the Flesquieres ridge, as this could not be held unless the British army was prepared for prolonged and severe fighting.
The line to which it fell back left it in possession of an important section of the Hindenburg Line, but gave Gonnelieu and Villers-Guislain to the Germans. The Germans claimed the capture of 9,000 British prisoners and 148 British guns with large quantities of material, but these claims were probably exaggerated. The total British loss in this battle was given by the British authorities as 45,000. The German loss was probably heavier from the close formations employed and the absence of tanks on their side.
After their defeat in the battle of Epehy, the Germans fell back on the vast fortified system of the Hindenburg Line which protected the whole centre of their front, at its most important point, near Cambrai. This had been strengthened and improved by the labour of prisoners since the earlier battle of Cambrai, and was now a most formidable obstacle. From Arleux to Havrincourt it ran along the Canal du Nord, which could not be thoroughly reconnoitred by the British because both banks were in German hands. Near Havrincourt the British had a bridge-head. From Havrincourt southwards the fortified system was carried well to the west of the Schelde Canal, which at various points .passed through deep cuttings, and, between Vendhuile and Bellicourt, through a long tunnel. Some short distance to the south of Bellicourt the canal was dry. The tunnel was connected by shafts with the German trench systems; the sides of the canal in the cuttings were utilised for the construction of dug-outs; and where the canal was dry it served as a covered way.
The Hindenburg system was nowhere less than 7,000 yards wide, and in places it was from 10,000 to 17,000 yards wide. It consisted of two sets of continuous trenches, dug very deep and broad, so as, the Germans hoped, to be proof against tankattack. The first set of trenches had two trench lines, about 1,000 yards apart. They were each provided with concrete and steel emplacements for machine guns and were wired with belts about 50 feet wide; sometimes there were eight or ten belts to each trench. There was also a maze of machine-gun pits, tunnels, large subterranean shelters and trenches independent of the two main lines. The other set, also of two continuous trenches, was sited two miles or more back from the outer line, and each trench in this was very heavily wired and provided with deep and large dug-outs. The second set of trenches had an interval of about 1,000 yards between its two lines.
The German intention was to hold this vast system through the winter, exhaust the Allies, and after beating off their attacks to induce them to enter into peace negotiations, as it was realized by Ludendorff that after the failure of the German offensives, a German victory was out of the question. The belief in the impregnability of the Hindenburg Line was complete in Germany. The British Government seems to have shared the belief that the storming of the line was an enterprise too dangerous to be attempted until the arrival of American troops and American artillery in masses. It had grave misgivings, knowing that the British armies in France, after their desperate exertions during the German offensives of March, April, and May, had been for six weeks continuously fighting and had suffered considerably.
Special tanks had been built in the winter of 1917-18 for the attack on the line - Mark V star - which were increased in length from 23.5 feet to 32 feet 5 inches, so as to be able to stride across the wide Hindenburg trenches without using fascines or the heavy bridgingtackle which smaller tanks required. In cooperation with the British armies, which were to break the German centre and attack the Germans where they were strongest, the Belgian and Allied forces were to advance in Flanders, the French were to attack west of the Argonne, and the Americans, with some 500,000 men, were to advance in the Argonne itself.
The British armies which were to be engaged were the 1st (Home), 3rd (Byng), and 4th (Rawlinson), in order from north to south; it was decided that the 1st and 3rd armies should open the battle before Cambrai, attacking on a front of 13 miles from south of Arleux to Gouzeaucourt, with the Canadians, 17th, 6th, and 4th corps in the order named. On the northern section of attack the troops would have before them the Canal du Nord, which thereabouts was dry, but was wide, deep, and difficult to cross. They were, therefore, to force a passage near Moeuvres, where the canal seemed, from aeroplane reconnaissance, to be practicable for tanks, and then deploy fanwise. They were also to advance from the bridge-head over the canal south-west of Flesquieres.
A heavy bombardment was opened by the British artillery in the night of September the 26th and 27th; the Germans replying with violence. At 5.20 a.m. the infantry went over the top, led by 53 tanks, among them several Mark V star. When the tanks took the wide German trenches the German infantry for the most part were seized with panic and gave way. But there was heavy fighting at many points. Ribecourt and Flesquieres were both carried early in the day, as also was Bourlon. The whole of Bourlon Wood was captured by the Canadians with but little loss; and Fontaine-Notre-Dame, which had resisted repeated British attacks in that year, was reached. At the close of the day the Hindenburg system north of Gouzeaucourt was in ruins. British troops reached the outskirts of Sailly, some six miles from the starting point of the attack, and could thence bring the railway junction at Cambrai under effective fire. Over 10,000 prisoners and 200 guns had been taken, and one of the most stupendous victories of the war had been won. No more terrible blow had been struck, and none had a more profound effect on German opinion, because the collapse of the Hindenburg system came to the German people as a warning that the war would be carried into Germany, and that no defensive plans could stop the Allied armies and their tanks.
During this great and triumphant assault on the northern section of the Hindenburg system, American troops attached to Sir Douglas Haig's armies were delivering a most gallant attack on the outworks of that system, along the 6,000 yards of front between Vendhuile and Bellicourt, where the Schelde Canal passes through the tunnel. They were of the 27th division and were supported by twelve British tanks; but they encountered so desperate a resistance that, though they reached their objectives, they could not maintain themselves and were driven back.
On September the 28th, on the northern section of attack, the British troops continued their advance and secured the villages which they had entered, completing their capture of Sailly, Marcoing, and Fontaine-Notre-Dame, and crossing the Schelde Canal at Marcoing, where they broke through another great series of German entrenchments. The Germans, hard pressed for reinforcements, were compelled to draw troops from Flanders, as Cambrai was a pivotal point; and this withdrawal opened the way for an Allied advance in Belgium.
On September the 29th Sir Douglas Haig concentrated his strength in an attack on the southern section of the Hindenburg Line, in which, on a front of twelve miles from Vendhuile to south of Bellenglise, three corps - the Australians, the Americans, and the 9th - advanced, supported by 175 tanks, among them being an American battalion equipped with British tanks. The American troops of the 27th division had great difficulties to overcome. The strength of the German works in their front was immense; the mist on the morning of attack was so dense that the movements of the infantry and tanks were hampered; and by a great misfortune the 301st battalion of American tanks, which was cooperating, was caught in an old British minefield, laid in March, 1918, the existence of which had not been notified to the Tank Corps staff. Many tanks were destroyed, and the 27th division could not advance as far as had been intended. The American 30th division, however, stormed Bellicourt and occupied Nauroy, penetrating the centre of the German position.
To the north of it two Australian divisions passed through the 27th division and made some advance; while farther north, again, the 12th and 18th British divisions pushed in near Vendhuile. But the greatest fighting of the day was done by the 46th division, which stormed Bellenglise. Equipped with lifebelts, mats, and rafts, it crossed the Schelde Canal, and many of its men had to swim the water. In this famous feat the 5th and 6th South Staffords and 6th North Staffords covered themselves with glory. They captured an important bridge before it could be destroyed, and in 2.5 hours from the start had secured the German system east of the canal, which from its strength was reputed impregnable. On the northern front of attack Masnieres was stormed, and the Schelde Canal crossings near it were secured, while the Canadians pushed in towards the northern outskirts of Cambrai.
On September the 30th the attack was renewed all along the line and important progress was made. The Germans, threatened with envelopment, everywhere fell back behind the Schelde Canal north of Vendhuile. Le Tronquoy with a smaller tunnel on the canal was captured. On October the 1st New Zealand and Canadian troops continued the envelopment of Cambrai from the north, reaching Ramillies, but only at the price of great efforts, as the German resistance here was particularly strenuous, and no fewer than 11 German divisions were engaged on this section of the front from first to last. The Canadians suffered severely, but their stubborn gallantry brought great results. To the south Joncourt and Bony were stormed by the Australians and tanks. Between October the 3rd and 5th, Montbrehain, Estrees, and Beaurevoir were taken by them with great dash, enabling the British forces to advance to the east of the Schelde Canal from Montbrehain northwards. On October the 1st, the French 1st army occupied St Quentin.
In this battle, between September the 27th and October the 5th, the Hindenburg system was shattered for a distance of 40 miles from north to south and Cambrai itself was reached. The total advance was from 11 to 15 miles. Not only this, but a wide gap was made in the rearward German defences, so that only incomplete German trench systems now remained before the British armies in this sector; they were in sight of open country and on the eve of the war of movement. The German centre on the Western front had been penetrated. In all, 30 British and 2 American divisions were engaged against 39 German divisions. The number of prisoners taken was 36,500, greater than in any other single Allied victory in the war on the Western front, and the guns captured numbered 380. It was the decisive battle of the war, leading the German Staff to urge the immediate opening of peace negotiations.
The effect of the loss of the Hindenburg system upon the moral of the German troops was very marked, and they did not thereafter on the British front fight with the determination which they showed before Cambrai. In tactics, the chief features of the victory were the skilful employment of tanks, and the 'leap-frogging' of fresh divisions through the exhausted British troops, by which the vigour of the attack was steadily maintained. Research Battle of Cambrai
The Battle of Givenchy was an inconclusive Great War battle between British and German forces in December 1914. In early December 1914 an Allied force was opposing strong German defences around Givenchy, a French village in the Pas-de-Calais. In order to relieve pressure on the French, then fighting at Arras, orders were given to attack and pin down the Germans so that they could not reinforce Arras. Indian troops of the Lahore division attacked on the 19th of December and captured two lines of German trenches but were then driven out by a fierce counterattack.
On the 20th of December the Germans, strongly reinforced, mounted a sudden attack against the Indian trenches which were inundated due to rain, and broke through to occupy part of the village. Two British battalions in reserve were called up and recaptured the village in the evening. The battle continued and several salients were driven into the British line, until Field Marshal Sir Douglas Haig brought up reinforcements from the 1st Army on the 21st of December, relieved the Indian division, and forced the Germans back to their original line. The battle died out the following day with all participants back where they had started, at a cost of about 4, 000 British and 2,000 German casualties. Research Battle of Givenchy
The British Expeditionary Force (BEF) was the British army serving in France during the Great War and also the 1939 to 1940 army in Europe during the Second World War, which was evacuated from Dunkirk, France. In the Great War the BEF was first commanded by General J French and then General Douglas Haig. It consisted of five infantry and one cavalry division, numbering about 100,000 men. A sixth infantry division joined this force in September. The term 'BEF' strictly referred only to the forces initially sent to France in 1914, but it continued to be commonly applied to the British forces operating in France and Flanders. During the Second World War General Gort commanded the BEF sent to France in 1939. By May 1940 it consisted of 10 infantry divisions, one tankbrigade, and an RAF element of about 500 fighters and light bombers. After sustaining heavy losses during the French and Belgian campaigns of 1940 the remains were evacuated from Dunkirk in June, leaving much of their equipment behind. Research British Expeditionary Force
Abbreviations
Research Douglas Haig
