There have been many dates dubbed 'Black Monday', but the first was EasterMonday, 14th April 1360, 'so full dark of mist and hail, and so bitter cold that many men died on their horsebacks with the cold.' The day on which a number of English were slaughtered at a village near Dublin in 1209. The day of panic in 1745 when the Scottish rebels were reported to have arrived at Derby, and the Bank of England paid in sixpences. Research Black Monday
There is evidence of the use of crystal balls as a means of divination in medieval times, and 'scrying' in some of its many forms was by no means rare in the Greek and Roman periods. The essential requisite for the exercise of this species of divination is a polished surface of some sort upon which the scryer shall gaze intently; for this purpose mirrors, globules of lead or mercury, polished steel, the surface of water, and even pools of ink, have been employed and have been found to ensure quite as satisfactory results as the crystal ball. The points of light reflected from the polished surface serve to attract the attention of the gazer and to fix the eye until, gradually, the optic nerve becomes so fatigued that it finally ceases to transmit to the sensorium the impression made from without and begins to respond to the reflex action proceeding from the brain of the gazer. In this way the impression received from within is apparently projected and seems to come from without.
It is easy to understand that the results must vary according to the idiosyncrasy of the various scryers; for everything depends upon the sensitiveness of the optic nerve. In many cases the effect of prolonged gazing upon the brilliant surface will simply produce a loss of sight, the optic nerve will be temporarily paralysed and will as little respond to stimulation from within as from without; in other cases, however, the nerve will be only deadened as regards external impressions, while retaining sufficient activity to react against a stimulus from the brain centres. It is almost invariably stated that, prior to the appearance of the desired visions, the crystal seems to disappear and a mist rises before the gazer's eye. The Achaians, as Pausanius relates, frequently used a mirror to divine diseases or to learn whether there was danger of sudden death. Research Crystal Gazing
Sigourney Weaver (Susan Alexandra Weaver) is an American actress. She was born in 1949 at New York, USA. She won the 1989 Golden Globe award for best actress for her role in the film ' Gorillas In The Mist' and a 1998 BAFTA award for best performance by an actress in a supporting role in the film 'The Ice Storm'. Research Sigourney Weaver More pictures of Sigourney Weaver
In Greek mythology, the Graeae were three daughters of Phorcys and Ceto: Deino, Pephredo, and Enyo; their names meaning respectively 'alarm', 'dread', and 'horror'. They were sisters and at the same time guardians of the Gorgons, they were conceived as misshapen hideous creatures, hoary and withered from their birth, with only one eye and one tooth for the common use of the three, and were supposed to inhabit a dark cavern near the entrance to Tartarus. The belief in their existence seems to have been originally suggested by the grey fog or mist which lies upon the sea and is a frequent source of danger to the mariner. It is said that Perseus obtained from them the necessary information as to the dwelling of the Gorgons by seizing; their solitary eye and tooth, and refusing to return them until they showed him the way. Research Graeae
In Norse mythology, Muspell or Muspellheim was one of the two worlds which existed before existence.
Muspell was a fire continent, the mirror image of the ice continent, Niflheim. Flames reaching out from Muspell touched the ice glaciers at the edge of Niflheim, thawing the ice and forming a frozen mist which eventually took form as the giantYmir. Research Muspell
There were two Battles of Cambrai during the Great War. The first was a British victory in November 1917, the second Battle of Cambrai was part of the great Allied attack of September and October 1918.
During the retreat of the British and French armies from Belgium after the battles of Mons and Charleroi (August 23rd-24th, 1914), efforts were made by the French forces in Flanders to strike the flank of the advancing German army and facilitate the retirement of the British. The 61st and 62nd French reserve divisions and 84th Territorial division under General d'Amade, with General Sordet's cavalry corps, took part in these operations.
On August the 26th 1914, they were heavily engaged near Cambrai with the 2nd German Infantry Corps (forming part of Kluck's 1st Army), while the British were fighting at Le Cateau. The French divisions were newly mobilised, wanting in coherence, and were exposed to the attack of some of the best troops in the German army. Inferior in numbers, and greatly inferior in artillery and equipment, they were rapidly driven back; Cambrai was seized by the Germans on August the 26th, and d'Amade's infantry were so greatly shaken that Joffre in a message of September the 3rd expressed the hope that they might be 'able to recover some steadiness'. But by their sacrifice they covered the withdrawal of the British from Le Cateau, and thus actually rendered important services.
From this time until the end of 1917 there was no fighting around Cambrai, as, the Germans' line being well to the west of it, the city was outside the actual battle zone. The battle of the Somme, in the autumn of 1916, had Bapaume and Peronne as its immediate objectives, and Cambrai and St Quentin as the ultimate goal.
The first battle of Cambrai began on November the 20th, 1917, when Sir Douglas Haig, as the best means of assisting the Italians, who were then being heavily attacked, determined to deliver a sudden blow on the British front. The intended battle was of a revolutionary type, the first of a new order in war; it was to be marked by two new features, both of which had been planned by the staff of the Tank Corps in the summer of 1917. They were the employment of tanks in masses to break through the German line where it was strongest, and the abandonment of the long, preliminary artillerybombardment which up to that date had been usual before a battle, to cut the wire, shake the opposing infantry, and prepare the way for the final assault.
The point selected was on the front of the 3rd army (Byng), west of Cambrai, where the ground was suitable for tank movements. It had the defect, which was pointed out by the Tank Staff that a break-through there, if successful, would bring the British up against the German system of water and canal defence, from near Cantaing to Marcoing, Masnieres, Crevecoeur, and Banteux. The scheme of operations provided for the employment of 350 tanks and 2 corps of infantry;
these were to be thrown suddenly upon the Germans, who formed part of Marwitz's 2nd army. All the tanks were to be put in at the outset; there was to be no reserve to exploit any victory, and this decision was taken against the advice of the tank leaders. The Hindenburg line would have to be crossed; it consisted of three lines of trenches, each 12 feet (3.6 meters) or more wide, with wide belts of strong wire in front. Provision was made for bridging the trenches with special fascines carried by the tanks.
The attack opened at 6.20a.m. on the 20th of November 1917, in mist, when the whole line of tanks swept forward, led in the centre by Major-General H. Elles, commander of the Tank Corps, and followed by the infantry, who had not had previous experience of working with tanks. The front of attack was 6 miles from Havrincourt to La Vacquerie. As the tanks advanced, 1,000 British guns suddenly opened and maintained a creeping barrage. When the Germans saw that the tanks were able to cross the Hindenburg trenches, many of them fled in panic, but at the villages there was severe fighting, due in some cases to the fact that the infantry had not been able to keep pace with the tanks. Havrincourt and Ribecourt were carried, but at Flesquieres many tanks were put out of action by field guns, and the German resistance was stubborn.
At Marcoing an important bridge was captured by a tank before the Germans could destroy it; but at Masnieres, the bridge, vital for an enveloping advance against Cambrai, was so damaged that when a tank officer gallantly tried to cross it, it gave way slowly under him and finally collapsed; and other tanks which arrived could not cross the Schelde Canal. None the less, they enabled the infantry to force a passage, covering them with their fire. At nightfall the British had penetrated at points 10,000 yards, taking all three trenches of the Hindenburg line, and captured Graincourt, Marcoing, and Masnieres; they had isolated Flesquieres; tanks had also pushed into Bourlon Wood, but the infantry, from exhaustion, were unable to follow and support them.
On November the 21st the battle was resumed by Sir J. Byng with tired infantry, and tanks which had been through one great engagement already. Cantaing was taken, as also Fontaine-Notre-Dame, bringing the British close up to Cambrai on the west, but Fontaine-Notre-Dame was lost the next day to a furious German counter-attack.
Nearly all Bourlon Wood was secured on November the 23rd. German reserves were now arriving and efforts to storm Bourlon village and to recover Fontaine-Notre-Dame failed, though they were renewed on November the 25th, 26th, and 27th. The tank crews had been fought to a standstill, and the infantry were worn out. The position of Cambrai as a great railway junction enabled the Germans to bring up fresh troops from every direction.
On November the 27th the battle was broken off. The British had taken 10,500 prisoners and 142 guns; the German losses in prisoners were double the British casualties in the first two days of the battle. The effect on the German army was serious, and was intensified by the German reports, which frightened their men by stating that the victory had been snatched by the British use of tanks in masses. Most important was the influence on the French command, which had hitherto been doubtful of the value of tanks, but from the date of the battle entertained no more doubts. General Franchet d'Esperey's comment on it, that it was a great victory, was fully justified in the light of subsequent events. The tactics first tested at Cambrai were those which led to the far-reaching successes gained by Foch on July the 18th, 1918, and by the British in the battle of Amiens on August the 8th 1918. This battle marks a turning point in military history - the vindication of mechanical war.
It was unfortunate for the British army that the great success won in the first part of this battle was followed by a counter-stroke in which much of the fruit of the earlier victory was lost, because this led in that army to a belief that tanks were, after all, a doubtful weapon. It undoubtedly delayed their rapid construction on the largest possible scale. Immediately after their reverse, the Germans decided at all cost to attack, in order to clear Cambrai, a point of extreme importance to them because of its railway facilities.
The plan worked out by the Germans provided for a surprise assault at two points, on each side of the salient in which lay Bourlon Wood, from the south-east by a group of 12 divisions advancing between Cantaing and Vendhuile, and from the north-west by a group of five divisions, advancing three hours after the first attack had begun, between Moeuvres and Bourlon. Yet another division was to attack Bourlon Wood frontally, while the salient was being pinched out. The British force holding the front was only six divisions strong, so that the Germans had a strength of three to one, 18 divisions to 6.
The German tactics were skilful. The bombardment which preceded the first attack was sufficiently strong to keep the British troops under cover without at first seriously alarming them ; it was followed by a series of aeroplane attacks, the machines flying low in squadrons, and machine-gunning and bombing the British trenches, after which the German trench mortars opened, and the German infantry, about 8 a.m. on November the 30th, swept into the British position on the south-eastern section of attack. They advanced rapidly with great bravery and penetrated deep, taking Villers-Guislain, Gonnelieu, and Gouzeaucourt, but not without fierce fighting. At noon the Guards came into action and recaptured Gouzeaucourt, attacking with the greatest gallantry and promptitude. Tanks of three battalions, which had been opened up for overhaul and repair, were able to assist the infantry in the afternoon. The recovery of much of the lost ground was assisted by the determination with which detachments of British troops had held their positions even when outflanked and surrounded ; the 29th division specially distinguished itself in this way.
The north-western German attack followed, as had been arranged, after the south-eastern attack had already made great progress. The German infantry advanced in dense waves against the 47th, 2nd, and 56th British divisions, which offered a most stubborn and determined resistance and inflicted on the Germans very heavy losses, enfilading their advancing waves of infantry with machine-gun fire and mowing them down. The German accounts speak of their 'desperate and most strenuous defence'. Some ground was gained by the Germans but at a bitter price. A company of the 13th Essex here fought to the very last, -deciding after a council of war to have no surrender, and its heroism was not in vain. In Bourlon Wood the Germans, made a little progress despite an equally gallant resistance offered by the 1st Berkshire.
British reserves were brought up and a force of French artillery came into action during the afternoon of November the 30th. On December the 1st the battle was renewed, the Germans attempting on the north to hold the British at Bourlon Wood, while their southern attack penetrated deep and cut them. off. The Guards fought their way into Gonnelieu on the southern front with the aid of tanks; GaucheWood was recovered with the cooperation of tanks; and a great effort was made to recapture Villers-Guislain, but it failed owing to the violence of the German machine-gun fire and the small number of tanks available. Masnieres had to be abandoned owing to the loss of commanding ground south of it; and the troops were successfully withdrawn during the night of December 1st to 2nd.
On December the 2nd and 3rd there was heavy fighting between Gonnelieu and Bourlon, and the Germans captured La Vacquerie and forced the evacuation of the ground held beyond the Schelde Canal near Marcoing. December the 4th passed quietly with nothing but local fighting, but on the 5th and 6th fresh efforts were made by the Germans to capture Welsh Ridge, north of Gonnelieu; and though these were repulsed, the British command decided to abandon Bourlon Wood and the ground north of the Flesquieres ridge, as this could not be held unless the British army was prepared for prolonged and severe fighting.
The line to which it fell back left it in possession of an important section of the Hindenburg Line, but gave Gonnelieu and Villers-Guislain to the Germans. The Germans claimed the capture of 9,000 British prisoners and 148 British guns with large quantities of material, but these claims were probably exaggerated. The total British loss in this battle was given by the British authorities as 45,000. The German loss was probably heavier from the close formations employed and the absence of tanks on their side.
After their defeat in the battle of Epehy, the Germans fell back on the vast fortified system of the Hindenburg Line which protected the whole centre of their front, at its most important point, near Cambrai. This had been strengthened and improved by the labour of prisoners since the earlier battle of Cambrai, and was now a most formidable obstacle. From Arleux to Havrincourt it ran along the Canal du Nord, which could not be thoroughly reconnoitred by the British because both banks were in German hands. Near Havrincourt the British had a bridge-head. From Havrincourt southwards the fortified system was carried well to the west of the Schelde Canal, which at various points .passed through deep cuttings, and, between Vendhuile and Bellicourt, through a long tunnel. Some short distance to the south of Bellicourt the canal was dry. The tunnel was connected by shafts with the German trench systems; the sides of the canal in the cuttings were utilised for the construction of dug-outs; and where the canal was dry it served as a covered way.
The Hindenburg system was nowhere less than 7,000 yards wide, and in places it was from 10,000 to 17,000 yards wide. It consisted of two sets of continuous trenches, dug very deep and broad, so as, the Germans hoped, to be proof against tankattack. The first set of trenches had two trench lines, about 1,000 yards apart. They were each provided with concrete and steel emplacements for machine guns and were wired with belts about 50 feet wide; sometimes there were eight or ten belts to each trench. There was also a maze of machine-gun pits, tunnels, large subterranean shelters and trenches independent of the two main lines. The other set, also of two continuous trenches, was sited two miles or more back from the outer line, and each trench in this was very heavily wired and provided with deep and large dug-outs. The second set of trenches had an interval of about 1,000 yards between its two lines.
The German intention was to hold this vast system through the winter, exhaust the Allies, and after beating off their attacks to induce them to enter into peace negotiations, as it was realized by Ludendorff that after the failure of the German offensives, a German victory was out of the question. The belief in the impregnability of the Hindenburg Line was complete in Germany. The British Government seems to have shared the belief that the storming of the line was an enterprise too dangerous to be attempted until the arrival of American troops and American artillery in masses. It had grave misgivings, knowing that the British armies in France, after their desperate exertions during the German offensives of March, April, and May, had been for six weeks continuously fighting and had suffered considerably.
Special tanks had been built in the winter of 1917-18 for the attack on the line - Mark V star - which were increased in length from 23.5 feet to 32 feet 5 inches, so as to be able to stride across the wide Hindenburg trenches without using fascines or the heavy bridgingtackle which smaller tanks required. In cooperation with the British armies, which were to break the German centre and attack the Germans where they were strongest, the Belgian and Allied forces were to advance in Flanders, the French were to attack west of the Argonne, and the Americans, with some 500,000 men, were to advance in the Argonne itself.
The British armies which were to be engaged were the 1st (Home), 3rd (Byng), and 4th (Rawlinson), in order from north to south; it was decided that the 1st and 3rd armies should open the battle before Cambrai, attacking on a front of 13 miles from south of Arleux to Gouzeaucourt, with the Canadians, 17th, 6th, and 4th corps in the order named. On the northern section of attack the troops would have before them the Canal du Nord, which thereabouts was dry, but was wide, deep, and difficult to cross. They were, therefore, to force a passage near Moeuvres, where the canal seemed, from aeroplane reconnaissance, to be practicable for tanks, and then deploy fanwise. They were also to advance from the bridge-head over the canal south-west of Flesquieres.
A heavy bombardment was opened by the British artillery in the night of September the 26th and 27th; the Germans replying with violence. At 5.20 a.m. the infantry went over the top, led by 53 tanks, among them several Mark V star. When the tanks took the wide German trenches the German infantry for the most part were seized with panic and gave way. But there was heavy fighting at many points. Ribecourt and Flesquieres were both carried early in the day, as also was Bourlon. The whole of Bourlon Wood was captured by the Canadians with but little loss; and Fontaine-Notre-Dame, which had resisted repeated British attacks in that year, was reached. At the close of the day the Hindenburg system north of Gouzeaucourt was in ruins. British troops reached the outskirts of Sailly, some six miles from the starting point of the attack, and could thence bring the railway junction at Cambrai under effective fire. Over 10,000 prisoners and 200 guns had been taken, and one of the most stupendous victories of the war had been won. No more terrible blow had been struck, and none had a more profound effect on German opinion, because the collapse of the Hindenburg system came to the German people as a warning that the war would be carried into Germany, and that no defensive plans could stop the Allied armies and their tanks.
During this great and triumphant assault on the northern section of the Hindenburg system, American troops attached to Sir Douglas Haig's armies were delivering a most gallant attack on the outworks of that system, along the 6,000 yards of front between Vendhuile and Bellicourt, where the Schelde Canal passes through the tunnel. They were of the 27th division and were supported by twelve British tanks; but they encountered so desperate a resistance that, though they reached their objectives, they could not maintain themselves and were driven back.
On September the 28th, on the northern section of attack, the British troops continued their advance and secured the villages which they had entered, completing their capture of Sailly, Marcoing, and Fontaine-Notre-Dame, and crossing the Schelde Canal at Marcoing, where they broke through another great series of German entrenchments. The Germans, hard pressed for reinforcements, were compelled to draw troops from Flanders, as Cambrai was a pivotal point; and this withdrawal opened the way for an Allied advance in Belgium.
On September the 29th Sir Douglas Haig concentrated his strength in an attack on the southern section of the Hindenburg Line, in which, on a front of twelve miles from Vendhuile to south of Bellenglise, three corps - the Australians, the Americans, and the 9th - advanced, supported by 175 tanks, among them being an American battalion equipped with British tanks. The American troops of the 27th division had great difficulties to overcome. The strength of the German works in their front was immense; the mist on the morning of attack was so dense that the movements of the infantry and tanks were hampered; and by a great misfortune the 301st battalion of American tanks, which was cooperating, was caught in an old British minefield, laid in March, 1918, the existence of which had not been notified to the Tank Corps staff. Many tanks were destroyed, and the 27th division could not advance as far as had been intended. The American 30th division, however, stormed Bellicourt and occupied Nauroy, penetrating the centre of the German position.
To the north of it two Australian divisions passed through the 27th division and made some advance; while farther north, again, the 12th and 18th British divisions pushed in near Vendhuile. But the greatest fighting of the day was done by the 46th division, which stormed Bellenglise. Equipped with lifebelts, mats, and rafts, it crossed the Schelde Canal, and many of its men had to swim the water. In this famous feat the 5th and 6th South Staffords and 6th North Staffords covered themselves with glory. They captured an important bridge before it could be destroyed, and in 2.5 hours from the start had secured the German system east of the canal, which from its strength was reputed impregnable. On the northern front of attack Masnieres was stormed, and the Schelde Canal crossings near it were secured, while the Canadians pushed in towards the northern outskirts of Cambrai.
On September the 30th the attack was renewed all along the line and important progress was made. The Germans, threatened with envelopment, everywhere fell back behind the Schelde Canal north of Vendhuile. Le Tronquoy with a smaller tunnel on the canal was captured. On October the 1st New Zealand and Canadian troops continued the envelopment of Cambrai from the north, reaching Ramillies, but only at the price of great efforts, as the German resistance here was particularly strenuous, and no fewer than 11 German divisions were engaged on this section of the front from first to last. The Canadians suffered severely, but their stubborn gallantry brought great results. To the south Joncourt and Bony were stormed by the Australians and tanks. Between October the 3rd and 5th, Montbrehain, Estrees, and Beaurevoir were taken by them with great dash, enabling the British forces to advance to the east of the Schelde Canal from Montbrehain northwards. On October the 1st, the French 1st army occupied St Quentin.
In this battle, between September the 27th and October the 5th, the Hindenburg system was shattered for a distance of 40 miles from north to south and Cambrai itself was reached. The total advance was from 11 to 15 miles. Not only this, but a wide gap was made in the rearward German defences, so that only incomplete German trench systems now remained before the British armies in this sector; they were in sight of open country and on the eve of the war of movement. The German centre on the Western front had been penetrated. In all, 30 British and 2 American divisions were engaged against 39 German divisions. The number of prisoners taken was 36,500, greater than in any other single Allied victory in the war on the Western front, and the guns captured numbered 380. It was the decisive battle of the war, leading the German Staff to urge the immediate opening of peace negotiations.
The effect of the loss of the Hindenburg system upon the moral of the German troops was very marked, and they did not thereafter on the British front fight with the determination which they showed before Cambrai. In tactics, the chief features of the victory were the skilful employment of tanks, and the 'leap-frogging' of fresh divisions through the exhausted British troops, by which the vigour of the attack was steadily maintained. Research Battle of Cambrai
The Battle of Caporetto was a joint German-Austrian victory over the Italian Army in October 1917 during the Great War, at Caporetto, a village on the river Isonzo in north-west Slovenia. The German commander, General Karl von Bulow, broke through Italian lines on the Isonzo and forced an Italian retreat to fall back onto the Piave line.
At the close of September the Italian offensive against Austria in 1917 came to an end in the Isonzo area. The front extended from north of Plezzo to the Adriatic.
By the end of the third week of October it was known to Cadorna that Germans were reinforcing the Austrians. For two or three weeks before he had been aware that the enemy was preparing an offensive, but he had no idea that it would be on a large scale. But during the summer the German general staff had planned a great offensive, to be developed with those novel tactics that had just been successful against the Russians.
The belief in Italy was that the enemy's attack would be in and from the Trentino and the north front. Here the Italians had the fifth army, under General Morone, on the west side of the Trentino, the first army, under General Pecori-Giraldi, on the east side of it to the Brenta, and the fourth army, under General de Robilant, from the Brenta, across Cadore and Carnia, to the junction of its right with the left of the second army on the Isonzo. Over against these armies were the army commanded by von Hoetzendorff in the Trentino, and the army commanded by von Krobatin in Cadore and Carnia: both of them Austrian armies, stiffened with some German troops. Against the Italian second army was now arrayed a new army, consisting of six German divisions and several Austrian divisions, under von Below, who had been transferred from the French front. He took extraordinary precautions to keep his plans secret. To make sure that no soldier under his orders revealed them to the enemy, he withdrew all Austro-Hungarian troops between Tolmino and Plezzo, and sent his own shock troops into the battle-line.
Von Below, with Ludendorff in the background, was the driving force of the enemy offensive, which began on October the 23rd and 24th, with an intense bombardment from Plezzo to the sea. On October the 24th the weather was wet, with a thick mist, which exactly suited von Below, who under cover of it took the Italians by surprise. After a pause in the bombardment, a tremendous fire was again concentrated on the lines between Plezzo and the Bainsizza plateau, and large infantry forces were hurled against the positions of the second army from Monte Rombon to near San Gabriele. The Italians held on the flanks, but the centre broke. On the north Below was
Checked at Saga, and on the south he made little progress, but he pierced the Italian front between the height of Krasji, south of Polounik, and the Vodil height, north-west of Tolmino.
Lower down, from west of Tolmino to Auzza, Below also broke through. Advancing from the Tolmino bridgehead in the mist, the Germans captured the heights of Globocak, which, however, were retaken by the Italians. Higher up, however, the enemy was clean through the Italian lines west of the Isonzo, and was aiming straight for Caporetto, had isolated an Italian force in the Monte Nero region, and was progressing up the Isonzo from the Vodil height district also towards Caporetto, south-east of which at the village of Luico there was extraordinarily obstinate fighting, the place changing hands eight times.
Severe fighting went on all through October the 25th over the greater part of this section, but the gap was rapidly enlarged. In some places the Italians, whose reserves did not come up in time, offered little or no resistance, but on most of the front the struggle was bitter. The troops who had held their ground at Saga had to retreat in haste, and on the Bainsizza plateau also the Italians were compelled to withdraw, with their flank exposed to attack owing to the destruction or disappearance of the corps south of Tolmino. Caporetto was lost, and an effort made by. Cadorna, to stem the enemy's advance was unsuccessful; masses of men of the second army were in headlong retreat under the shock of disaster, and to bring up fresh troops through the midst of the fugitives was almost impossible. Below, however, failed to take full advantage of his amazing good fortune. Had he swept in force from Caporetto to Cividale and Udine, and thence southward upon the flank and rear of the Italians, he would have annihilated them.
On October the 26th the situation grew worse. At some points the Italians made a stand, and died rather than surrender. Thus the men on Monte Nero who had been cut off on October the 24th perished. At other points the Italians stood nearly too long. Those who had continued to hold on to Globocak were almost surrounded before they withdrew. But by the afternoon of October the 26th Below was pressing down the valleys of the Judrio and the Natisone, and was sending a considerable force west from Saga into Carnia. Though the Italians from Monte Santo to Gorizia, forming the right of the second army, still maintained their ground, and the third army had defeated all the Austrian attacks in the Carso, the situation was such that Cadorna ordered a general retreat on the evening of October the 26th. The enemy was threatening to cut the communications of the whole Isonzo line as well as those of the Italians in Carnia.
The Italian retreat was first to the Tagliamento, but that river did not offer a line strong enough to stand on, and the retreat had to be continued to the Piave. It was a difficult retreat, particularly in the narrow space west of the Carso, across which the third army had to pass, but that army kept its cohesion in a wonderful manner, retired in good order under rearguards, who fought off the Austrians, and brought away most of its guns, after destroying some of its heavy pieces, the distance traversed to the Piave being about 60 miles. Farther north the 11th corps, which had been on the north of the Carso, reached the Tagliamento,, but found that the bridge had been destroyed, and large numbers of men were captured.
By November the 1st the bulk of the Italian army from the Isonzo had crossed the Tagliamento, and the retreat slowed down. Meanwhile the Germans were some distance into the Friulian Plain; Gorizia was again Austrian; Cividale, a burning ruin, was in the hands of Below, and Udine, which had been Cadorna's headquarters, was occupied by Below on October the 29th. The losses of the Italians were very heavy; the Germans put them at 200,000 in prisoners alone, and about 2,000
guns. On November the 3rd Below forced the passage of the Tagliamento at Pinzano, and struck south-west to, the Livenza, Next day .the Italians repulsed him when attempting a crossing of the Tagliamento near St Vito, but on November the 7th they quit the line of that river and fell back to the line of the Monticano Livenza, which was abandoned next day for the line of the Piave. By November the 10th they were standing there, and the retreat was: at an end. Research Battle of Caporetto
The Battle of Inkerman was an infantry battle of the Crimean War fought on the 5th of November 1854 when the Russians attacked the British forces besieging Sebastopol and were repulsed with the assistance of French and British reinforcements.
Inkerman Ridge, overlooking Sevastopol, was held by the British during the siege of that fortress, and here the Russians attacked them on October the 25th, but were repulsed without difficulty.
A more serious attack was made on the morning of November the 5th. Under cover of a fog a strong force of Russians from Sevastopol readied the British outposts before being seen. They were in superior numbers, for the British had only about 6,000 men here, chiefly the 2nd division, and at once they seized Shell Hill and got their heavy guns into position thereon. The mist, however, and the promptitude of Ponnefather, the general commanding the 2nd division, threw their plan out of gear, and after a confused fight between the infantry the Russians fell back, their general having been killed.
Another large Russian force had by now arrived and delivered another attack. This centred round a small battery, known as Sandbag battery, which a few British defended desperately against assault after assault. Reinforcements, British and French, soon arrived, and there were a number of small counter-attacks. Eventually the guns planted by the Russians on Shell Hill were silenced.
The British lost about 2,400 out of 8,500 engaged; the French lost over 900. The Russian losses were placed at 11,000 or 12,000 out of 42,000 engaged. The fight lasted about seven hours. Research Battle of Inkerman
The Battle of Philiphaugh took place on September the 13th 1645 and was a victory for Sir David Leslie over the Royalists under the Marquis of Montrose. The Royalist forces numbered some 500 Irish infantry and 1000 cavalry consisting solely of gentlemen. David Leslie heard of the weak state of the Royalist army and immediately embarked on a fast march to make a surprise attack on the Royalists. The Parliamentarian forces of some 4000 cavalry reached the Royalists while they were camped just below Selkirk and attacked in the morning mist on September the 13th 1645. Montrose and most of the Royalist cavalry escaped, but all but fifty of the Irish infantry were killed. Research Battle of Philiphaugh
The Probert Encyclopaedia was designed, edited and programed by
Matt and Leela Probert
Abbreviations
Research Black Monday
