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Research Results For 'Taxi'

TAXI

Taxi is the term applied to a hackney-carriage provided with a taximeter. In London, regulations for motor taxicabs were first issued in January 1907.
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KUMINGAN

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The Kumingan or Java Pony, is an Indonesian breed of pony that originated on the island of Java during the 17th century from cross breeding of horses imported by the Dutch East India company. The Kumingan is a placid, and good natured pony, standing 12 hands high and occurring in various colours. They are commonly used to pull the local taxi cart called a sado in Java.
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HELENE ADELE

Helene Adele is an English woman. She was born in 1907. Helene Adele was the victim of an attempt to pervert the course of justice by two Metropolitan police constables in 1928. In July 1928 Helene Adele was staying in a taxicab parked in a garage in London, with permission that she might sleep overnight in the taxi, when two PCs inspected the garage on their patrol. One constable entered the cab and tried to force Helene Adele to have sex with him. She refused, threatened to report the officer, and was subsequently arrested and charged on fabricated charges of using insulting words and behaviour. The truth came out in court, and Helene Adele was acquitted and the two constables charged with perjury and attempting to pervert the course of justice. At the officers trial an Acting-Sergeant gave false evidence that at the time of the incident one of the officers had been at the station. Both officers were convicted to 18 months hard-labour and the Acting-Sergeant was dismissed from the force for giving false evidence.
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CHRISTOPHER LLOYD

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Christopher Lloyd is an American actor. He was born in 1938 at Stamford, Connecticut. He first became noticed for his role as Reverend Jim Ignatowski in the 1970's television comedy Taxi before starring in the Back to the Future trilogy of films and the 1988 film Who Framed Roger Rabbit.
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DANNY DEVITO

Danny DeVito is an American actor, producer and film director. He was born in 1944 at Neptune, New Jersey. A former hairdresser, he came to public attention for his role in the television comedy series 'Taxi'.
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FRED GRIFFITHS

Fred Griffiths was an English actor. He was born in 1912 at Ludlow and died in 1994. A former fireman, he became an actor by accident and went on to play the role of a taxi driver in more than twenty films.
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JUDD HIRSCH

Judd Hirsch is an American actor. He was born in 1936 in the Bronx. He made his debut on Broadway in 1966 and spent many years at New York's Circle Repertory, where he appeared in the first-ever production of Lanford Wilson' s 'The Hot L Baltimore'. After an auspicious TV-movie role in the well- received 'The Law' in 1974, Hirsch landed his first weekly- series assignment, playing the title character in the cop drama Delvecchio from 1976 to 1977. From 1978 to 1982, he was seen as 'Alex Reiger' in the popular comedy 'Taxi', earning two Emmies in the process.
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MARILU HENNER

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Marilu Henner is an American actress and film producer. She was born in 1952 at Chicago, Illinois. Her first popular appearance was playing 'Elaine O'Connor-Nardo' in the 1970's television series 'Taxi'.
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ST FIACRE

St Fiacre is the patron saint of taxi-drivers.
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FIRST BATTLE OF THE MARNE

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The First Battle of the Marne was the first significant victory for the French army, supported by British troops, in September 1914 during the Great War. After a fortnight of defeat and retreat the French armies with the British took the initiative, and drove back the Germans in the west 35 miles.

On September the 4th, 1914, during the Great War, Joffre issued the order to the Allied armies to assume the offensive on September the 6th, and profit by the adventurous position of the 1st German army to concentrate against it the efforts of the Allied armies on the left.

On September the 4th the cipher which the Germans employed had fallen into his hands, and from that day onwards for a fortnight he knew many of the German movements. According to Admiral von Tirpitz the German staff, on September the 6th, secured the French plans.

Joffre had learnt from the airmen's reports that Kluck's 1st German army was at this date marching from north-east of Paris to a point east of Paris, in order to support Bulow's 2nd army in crushing the French 5th army, thus exposing the German right flank to a blow. Kluck and the German intelligence service believed the British army demoralised, and they knew nothing of the new French 6th army under Maunoury, which was assembling on their right flank. This army Joffre intended to use to crush the German right, which was covered by the 4th German reserve corps. Nor had the German command knowledge of the new French 9th army which was employed in the French centre.

The armies in presence from west to east were as follows:

Allies: 6th (Maunoury) 8 divisions; British (French) 5 divisions; 5th (Franchet d'Esperey) 11 divisions; 9th (Foch) 8 divisions; 4th (Langle de Cary) 8 divisions; 3rd (Sarrail) 11 divisions (total allied force 51 divisions).

Germans: 1st (Kluck) 10 divisions; 2nd (Bulow) 8 divisions; 3rd (Hausen) 6 divisions; 4th (Duke of Wurttemberg) 8 divisions; 5th (Crown Prince) 8 divisions. (total German force 40 divisions).

At full strength a division would number about 20,000 men, but all these units had been fighting and were far below establishment, so it is doubtful whether they averaged 12,000 on the first day of battle.


Thus, the French 12th corps had only 6 battalions fit for battle and present, and Gallieni estimates that 5.5 of Maunoury's divisions totalled only 60,000 men. To the above divisions, which may have numbered 600,000 men for the Allies and 450,000 for the Germans, must be added troops on the line of communications, and units brought up in the battle, at the close of which, according to German authorities, 45 German divisions had been engaged against 66 Allied divisions, Two German corps were neutralised by the Belgian army, and a third was besieging Maubeuge.

The Germans were confident of success, but their communications were bad; the Belgian resistance had dislocated their plan; and the unexpected vigour of the Russian attack had led them to divert two corps to Russia, and was thus, perhaps, the cause of their defeat. Their superiority in numbers had passed, though they still retained a great superiority in heavy artillery, aircraft, and equipment.

Joffre's orders, which reached the army commanders on September the 5th, were: the new 6th army to cross the Ourcq on the 6th, moving towards Chateau-Thierry, with the 1st cavalry corps linking it to the British; the British to face east and attack in the general direction of Montmirail; the 2nd French cavalry corps to link the British right to the left of the French 5th army, which was to attack north between Courtacon and Sezanne; the 9th was to cover the right of the 5th and move north of Sezanne; the 4th army to attack and link up with the 3rd, which was to attack the left flank of the Germans marching west of the Argonne.

The German orders were for the 1st army to follow the 2nd army, echeloned behind it, act as a protection to the German flank, and crush any hostile movement from Paris in conjunction with the 2nd army; for the 3rd army to advance towards Troyes-Vandoeuvre; for the 4th and 5th armies, by a continued advance south-east to open the passages of the upper Meuse to the 6th and 7th armies. The original idea of driving the French up against the Swiss frontier was abandoned, and a plan of double envelopment of the Allies adopted.

Joffre issued a general order to his troops calling on them, if they found it impossible to advance, to 'stand their ground at all cost and die rather than give way; this is a moment when no faltering will be tolerated'. Sir John French exhorted the British army 'to show now to the enemy its power and to push on vigorously to the attack beside the 6th French army', Similar orders were issued to the German troops, who were told that 'everything depends on the result of tomorrow'.

Joffre directed the 6th army to open the attack one day in advance of the other armies, and on September the 5th Maunoury's artillery and that of the 4th German reserve corps almost simultaneously opened fire near Monthyon, and fighting continued all that afternoon. The main battle began on Sunday, September the 6th. Kluck in the night had ordered two of his four corps south-east of Paris to march to the aid of his corps near Monthyon, and during the day he recalled the other two, thus opening an enormous gap between his army and Bulow's 2nd army, apparently supposing the British in his front to be incapable of action. The British, advancing slowly across the forest of Crecy, were held in the morning by a German demonstration, but in the afternoon, noting signs of a German retreat, pushed forward to the Grand Morin. Gallieni severely criticises the leisureliness of their advance.

Meanwhile the 6th French army attacked from Meaux north with great energy. Though Kluck was hurrying up reinforcements and the fire of the German artillery was deadly, the French gained ground. On the British right the 5th French army engaged Bulow's troops, and one of Kluck's four corps which was moving back across the Marne. They forced the Germans north in prolonged fighting, bending in Bulow's right flank and gravely threatening his position. The 9th army was heavily engaged north of Sezanne, where the Germans made great attempts to break through its front; it could do no more than barely hold its positions. The 4th army was forced back very slightly; the 3rd army generally checked the Crown Prince in his effort to move on Bar-le-Duc, but it lost ground at the south of the Argonne.

On September the 7th Kluck's movement of his whole army to the Ourcq imperilled the 6th French army, and, recognizing the danger, Gallieni hurried aid to that army in taxi cabs which he requisitioned. At dusk it had gained a little more ground, though the Germans now had three corps in action, and its left flank was in danger. But it had attracted to itself Kluck's whole force, and thus created the gap in the German front which proved fatal to the German plans. The British had been delayed by a German cavalry screen with infantry detachments from Kluck's troops, using machine guns very skilfully in difficult country, but they reached the Petit Morin after seizing Coulommiers, thrusting into the gap in the German front.

The 5th army pressed Bulow hard and pushed back his right six miles; it detached the 10th corps to the right to aid the 9th French army, which was again violently attacked and very hard pressed, but held its ground gallantly. The 4th army maintained its front everywhere except to its extreme right, where the loss of Sermaize was dangerous, imperilling its connexion with the 3rd army. The 3rd army was fiercely engaged. A German corps from Metz was attacking Fort Troyon and attempting to break through the Verdun line of forts. That day Maubeuge fell, setting free one German corps and vital railways at a moment when German supplies and ammunition were running low.

On September the 8th a fierce battle raged on the Ourcq, where each side strove to outflank the other without decided success; as the fresh German troops arrived the French northern flank wavered. Gallieni hurried up reinforcements and it held. The British crossed the Petit Morin, after at La Tretoire inflicting severe loss on the Germans; they began the attack on La Ferte-sous-Jouarre and violently shelled the Marne bridges crowded with German troops. The 5th army attacked with increased energy and crossed the Petit Morin high up, capturing Montmirail and placing Bulow in peril of having his whole front rolled up, as the gap between him and Kluck widened.

The 9th army was again violently attacked; the Prussian Guard assaulted at St. Gond and stormed Fere-Champenoise; Foch's centre and right were forced back under a fearful fire from the German heavy artillery, and all but broken. Foch's coolness and the fighting qualities of the French retrieved the position. But it is a fable that he sent to Joffre the message: 'My centre is giving ground; my right retiring; situation excellent; I am attacking'. The 4th army was attacked almost as fiercely, but did not yield. The 3rd army gained a little ground. The Germans bombarded Fort Troyon all the afternoon, yet at nightfall the garrison was unshaken. The crisis of the battle had arrived and the German ammunition was beginning to run low.

On September the 9th the flank battle on the Ourcq was fiercely maintained, as fresh German troops of Kluck's army assailed the 6th French army. Here there was extreme danger; a division of the 4th corps, one of the best, momentarily recoiled, then recovered itself. The British were thrusting north into the gap between Kluck and Bulow, and Kluck was now in imminent danger of being enveloped on both flanks and crushed. At noon Hentsch, who had been sent by the German staff to examine the position, reached the 1st army and stated that as Bulow was being forced back and the German situation was unfavourable, a general retreat to the Aisne must be executed.

At the critical moment the German staff had lost heart. Kluck began to retreat about 1 pm; an hour earlier Bulow announced by wireless that his own right was in retreat. The general retirement of the Germans, carrying with it the news that the great and decisive battle of the war had been won, was noticeable from the Allied line during the afternoon. Early in the day the British had reached the Marne and pushed through La Ferte, crossing the river there and also west of Chateau-Thierry, where they advanced four miles north of the Marne, thus threatening Kluck's rear and Bulow's right flank.

The 5th French army entered Chateau-Thierry, and the aid of its 1st and 10th corps decided the battle on the left of Foch's 9th army, which was still very hotly engaged north of Sezanne. It had been forced slightly back from the St. Gond marshes, but at dusk the position improved as the Germans weakened, and Mondement was stormed by the French. The 4th army attacked with great spirit on its right, and sent two divisions to its aid. The 3rd army advanced, but much of its attention was centred on Fort Troyon, where three German attacks that evening collapsed before the steadiness of the French garrison. Sarrail refused to abandon Verdun, though Joffre had authorised him to do so. At Nancy the Germans suffered a complete defeat.

On September the 10th the 6th French army rapidly gained ground as the German retreat was accentuated. Kluck's army this day was placed under Bulow. To the south French troops of the 6th army crossed the Ourcq and pushed north astride of that river, in conjunction with the British, who had now linked up with them. Thirteen guns and 2,000 prisoners were taken by the British, who pursued in pouring rain. The 5th army pushed its centre and right to the Marne, capturing six guns and 1,500 men. The 9th army attacked north and south of the St. Gond marshes, which were nearly dry, and hustled the German rearguards. It stormed La Fere-Champenoise in the morning and by the evening reached a line 11 miles south of Epernay. The 4th army attacked without success at Vitry-le-Francois, where the Germans were strongly entrenched. The 3rd army captured Sermaize and two German assaults on Fort Troyon were repulsed.

On September the 11th and 12th the Allies in the west advanced rapidly to the Aisne; the 9th army reached Epernay and Chalons, in the centre, and on September the 13th occupied Reims. The 4th army seized Vitry-le-Francois. The 3rd army pushed up to the line of railway from Verdun to Ste. Menehould. The Germans were now approaching or had actually reached the line which they were to fortify and hold, with little change, until 1916.

The German staff in its report on the battle states that the thrust of the British into the gap between the 1st and 2nd German armies compelled the retreat. This gap, however, had been caused by the brilliant work of the 6th French army. The hardest fighting fell to the lot of the French 6th and 5th armies, to Foch, and to the French before Nancy, but all fought magnificently. The net result was that after a fortnight of defeat and retreat the French armies with the British had taken the initiative, and driven back the Germans in the west 35 miles.

German critics severely blame, both Moltke and the Kaiser for the defeat, pointing- out that they withdrew troops for the east and left a large force in Belgium, thus fatally weakening the German attack on the Marne, and that they persisted in an attempt to break through at Nancy when they had not sufficient force for such an operation. None of the German army commanders showed any great genius. Bulow, Kluck, and Hausen blame one another, but Bulow is held responsible for the order for retreat.

The credit for the victory rests as much with Gallieni as with Joffre, though Gallieni's part has been often ignored. The French generalship was of a high order, but Gallieni held that mistakes were made in not bringing a larger force at the outset from Lorraine to the Ourcq (two additional corps were sent too late), and in failing to put in the French cavalry at the close of the battle to exploit the victory. The behaviour of the French troops was admirable. German and French authorities criticise the slowness of the British movements, which have not been satisfactorily explained, but may have been due to Sir John French's experiences at Mons and the orders from the British government to act with caution.

Kluck's swift withdrawal west instead of east surprised everyone and necessitated changes in the Allied movements; it was severely blamed by Bulow. Throughout the battle Gallieni employed what cavalry he had to raid the German flank and rear, and the work done in this direction was excellent. The French report the prisoners as being 38,000 with 160 guns (the latter nearly all damaged). The French loss was stated in the Chamber after the war at 300,000, which must include losses in the retreat and in the Lorraine battles of September. The British were only slightly engaged in the Marne proper.
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